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NEGLIGENCE AND THE ACT OF GOD
In Railroad Company v. Reeves, in the Supreme Court of the
United States,1 it was held, that where property in the charge
of a common carrier for transportation is destroyed by an act of
God, the carrier is excused from liability, though his own negli-
gence or laches subjected the property to the calamity., which
otherwise it would have escaped. It is distinctly laid down that
the maxim causa proxima non remota spectatur applies, and that
all that is required of the carrier is ordinary diligence to avoid
or remedy the effects of the overpowering cause. The Court cited
with approval the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
in Morrison v. Davis & Co,2 and of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, in Denny v. New York Central R. R. Co.3 In
the latter case it was held, that a railroad company, that
negligently delays the transportation of goods delivered to it as
a common carrier, and then transports them safely to their destin-
ation, is not responsible for injuries to the goods by a flood
while in its depot at that place, although they would not have
been exposed to such injury but for the delay.
Quite recently the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
made a similar ruling in Herring v. Chesapeake & Western R. R.
Co.4 Still more recently, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in
Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Henry,5 held, that as between the un-
justifiable and negligent failure to deliver goods from a freight
deppt upon demand at a time when there was no reasonable
ground to apprehend damage by flood, and an unprecedented
flood, which a day later submerged the depot and the goods, to
the damage of the latter, the flood, the act of God, and not the
negligent omission to deliver, is the proximate cause of the
damage. In the Kansas case, which follows the earlier decision
of the same Court, in Rodgers v. Railway Co.," the consideration
is emphasized that at the time when the defendant negligently
failed to make a delivery there were no reasonable grounds to
apprehend the calamity which overtook defendant and the plain-
tiff's goods.
Opposed to the doctrine of these cases, there is the authority
of the Court of Appeals of New York, as well as that of several
1 1869, To Wall., 176. 2 J852, 20 Penn. St., 171.
9 I859, 13 Gray, 481. 4 i9o3, ioi Va., 778.
a x9o8, 97 Pac., 465. g 197, 75 Kan., 222.
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other courts of last resort in recent utterances.7 The substance of
the New York decisions is conveyed by the following extract
from the syllabus in Read v. Spaulding.'
"When a carrier is entrusted with goods for transportation,
and they are injured or lost on the transit, the law holds him
responsible for the injury. He is only exempted by showing that
the injury was caused by an act of God or the public enemy. And
to avail himself of such exemption, he must show that he was
himself free from fault at the time.
"His act or neglect must not concur and contribute to the
injury. If he departs from the line of his duty and violates his
contract, and while thus in fault, and in consequence of that fault,
the goods are injured by the act of God, which would not other-
wise have caused the injury, he is not protected."
In Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchinson, etc., Ry. Co.,
9 it was
held by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, that if a carrier fails
to forward goods without unreasonable delay, and because of such
negligence they are "overtaken in transit and damaged by an
act of God, which would not have caused the damage had there
been no delay, he is liable, even though the act of God could not
reasonably have been anticipated. The negligent and unreason-
able delay is such a proximate or concurring cause as renders a
carrier liable."
A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court of Iowa in
Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co.'
0 The opinion
in this case, without expressly repudiating the "proximate cause"
doctrine, advances a special and cogent argument to support the
carrier's liability in the following language:
"It is not sufficient for the carrier to say by way of excuse that
while a proper and diligent transportation of the goods would
have kept them free from the peril by which they were in fact
lost, it might have subjected them to some other peril just as
great. He cannot speculate on mere possibilities. A pertinent
illustration is furnished by the well-settled rule with reference to
deviation which is that if the carrier transports the goods over
some other route than that specified in the contract or reasonably
within the contemplation of the parties, he must answer for any
loss or damage occurring during such deviation, although it is
from a cause which would not in itself render him liable. In such
a case it is said 'that no wrong-doer can be allowed to appor-
7 Michaels v. New York Central R. R. Co., 1864, 30 N. Y., 564; and
Read v. Spaulding, id. 630. i Supra.
9 i'o5, xo N. W., 709. 10 19o6, io6 N. W., 498.
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tion or qualify his own wrong, and that, as a loss has actually
happened whilst his wrongful act was in operation and force,
and which is attributable to his wrongful act, he cannot set up as
an answer to the action the bare possibility of a loss if his wrong-
ful act had never been done. It might admit of a different con-
struction if he could show, not only that the same loss might have
happened, but that it must have happened if the act complained
of had not been done.' Davis v. Garrett." "
In Alabama Great Southern R. R. Co. v. J. A. Elliott & Sons,12
it was held, that where a carrier delayed a shipment, with the
result that the goods were exposed to a cyclone, it was liable
"since its negligence, resulting in the delay at the place of ship-
ment, continued to be the active cause."
The decided tendency at present, when courts are not con-
trolled by previous local authority, is to follow the New York
doctrine, rather than that of the Supreme Court of the United
States. And this is obviously because of justice and expediency,
rather than superior weight of technical reason. Some of the
cases that decline to exonerate the carrier contend that its delay
constitutes a "concurring" or a "continuing" cause. In one sense,
this form of expression is legitimate, but, according to the real
logic of the situation, the act of God is the "proximate cause, be-
cause it is an entirely independent cause." Some commentators,
to justify mulcting the carrier, have even cited the famous "squib
case," which actually has no application whatsoever, because it
concerned a continuous and organic chain of causation, inevitably
set in motion by the first throwing of the squib.
In Foley v. McMahon,13 in the St. Louis Court of Appeals,
Missouri,' 3 this serviceable test is laid down:
"If the injury, whatever it may be, directly and naturally flows
from the negligence complained of, the defendant is liable, though
the particular injury would not ordinarily be expected to result
from such negligence. On the other hand, if the injury is ex-
traordinary and exceptional, such as no man could forsee or pro-
vide against, the defendant will not be liable, though the injury
would not have happened but for his negligence."
It could not be claimed that the destruction of property by an
act of God is ordinarily to be expected from negligent delay in
forwarding; the injury is exceptional, and such as could not be
forseen, according to the usual course of events. It seems to the
writer very clear that under existing abstract rules the Supreme
31 6 Bing., 716. 12 1907, i5o Ala.. 381.
13 90 S. W., 113.
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Court of the United States, and the courts following it, have the
best of the argument, with a result, however, so unjust and in-
expedient as to call for a frank revision of premises. Practically,
it is reductio ad absurdumn to say that no matter how long a car-
rier's delay may be, or how gross its negligence, it goes scot free,
and the property owner has no redress, if some extraordinary
action of the elements intervene. The suggestion that if the car-
rier had promptly begun the execution of its contract, some other
bolt from a clear sky might have fallen, and, therefore, it is not
absolutely certain that the owner would not have suffered loss in
any event, is too hypothetical and artificial to find place in a prac-
tical system of administering human affairs. In the obvious in-
terests of justice, a direct exception should be grafted upon the
theory of proximate and remote causes by holding that whenever
a person by his, or its, negligence exposes the person or property
of another to an act of God, that otherwise presumably would
have been escaped, damages may be recovered against the negli-
gent person for the injury sustained. Such a rule would
treat an act of God not as an independent agency, but as identical
with the damage or loss it produces, and confine legal consideration
to antecedent causes. In effect this is what has been done by the
courts of New York, Minnesota, Iowa. and Alabama, but they
have proceeded not straight-forwardly but by casuistical distinc-
tion.
This suggestion for an avowed change in the law is made for
the consideration of courts before which the question shall come
as one of first impression, and, more particularly, of courts that
are now committed to the view of the Supreme Court of the
United States. It would be entirely legitimate for tribunals in
the latter class to overrule their former decisions without an
enabling statute. Decisions of that kind do not afford a basis of
property rights of persons who have acted after they were ren-
dered, as was the case in Muhiker v. New York and Harlem R.
R. Co." It would not be seriously claimed that a contractual
right existed in the continuation as to future transactions of a
theory of exemption from liability on tort. Although there be
no legal obligation a court if it felt morally constrained might
adopt the same course in a tort case that was taken by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in a criminal case. In State v.
Bell. (136 N. C., 674) a former decision interpreting a criminal
statute was overruled. A new trial being granted, it was. how-
24 173 N. Y.. 549; 197 U. S.. 544.
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ever, directed that the same be had under the law as declared in
the discredited adjudication, "but the construction now put upon
the statute will be applied to all future cases."
The writer preceives no valid objection to disregarding the act
of God as a proximate cause, in cases of negligence by ordinary
individuals, or copartnerships, as well as by common carriers.
But, if this innovation should seem too sweeping, it might be
made to apply only to common carriers, under the historical policy
of holding them to exceptional and extraordinary liability. In
any event, the rules in question principally concern common car-
riers, and, therefore, the recent course of decisions, in which.
without statutory aid, courts, have assumed radical powers
in formulating and differentiating common-carrier law, is per-
tinent.
There has been a decided tendency of late to limit the scope
of the status of common carrier. In Griffin v. Manice, 5 and
Edwards v. Manufacturers' Bldg. Co.,16 it was held, that proprie-
tors of office buildings, operating passenger elevators, are not
common carriers. (Contra: Treadwell v. Whittier.) 7 In Haskell
v. Boston District Messenger Co.,' it was held by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts that messenger companies are
not essentially common carriers, and, further, that the knowl-
edge of such a company that messengers sent out by it are some-
times employed to carry money, does not render it a common
carrier, where it exercises no control over a messenger during his
employment for that purpose by a patron. In Meisner v. Detroit,
etc., Ry.,1' it was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan, that
where a corporation organized to own and operate ferries on a
river, also owned and operated an amusement park, with
special steamers for the transportation of persons to and from the
park steamers, and might refuse transportation upon them to
anyone at its pleasure, in like manner as proprietors of theaters
may determine arbitrarily who shall be admitted.
All of these decisions have been made upon a simple :ommon
law basis, and show a disposition to withhold the application of
the stringent rules affecting common carriers, evolved by more
primitive social and industrial conditions, from affairs as to which
they are not now necessary for public protection. Conversely,
the courts may properly modify the common law by extend-
ing a carrier's liability where the same is necessary for justice.
Wilbur Larremore.
25 166 N. Y.. 197. . 8o Cal., 574. 19 8 N. W., 14.
'18 76 N. E., 2T5.16 61 Atd. (R. 1.), 646.
